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The Effects of Task Relevance Instructions and Topic Beliefs  
on Reading Processes and Memory 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigated the effects of task relevance instructions and topic beliefs on reading 
processes and memory for belief-related text.  Undergraduates received task instructions (focus 
on arguments for versus against) before reading a dual-position text.  In Experiment 1 (n = 88), a 
reading time methodology showed no differences in reading time for task-relevant and task-
irrelevant text, but participants recalled task-relevant text better than task-irrelevant text 
independently of whether the information was consistent with their topic beliefs.  In Experiment 
2 (n = 76), a think-aloud methodology showed that participants engaged in confirmation 
strategies when reading belief-consistent text and disconfirmation strategies when reading belief-
inconsistent text, independently of whether the information was relevant to their task 
instructions.  Nonetheless, participants recalled task-relevant text better than task-irrelevant text.  
The results indicate that task relevance instructions affect memory independently of beliefs, but 
that beliefs affect processing independently of task relevance instructions.  Thus, moment-by-
moment reading processes and memory for text can operate differently as a function of topic 
beliefs.  
 
Keywords: reading processes, beliefs, task relevance instructions, think-aloud, memory 
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The Effects of Task Relevance Instructions and Topic Beliefs  
on Reading Processes and Memory 
Students have the right to believe whatever they want to believe, and schools cannot 
require students to change their beliefs (Moshman, 2009).  However, students must take courses, 
deemed necessary by appropriate authorities on the basis of academic justifications, to complete 
particular qualifications (e.g., high school diploma).  This can sometimes create a tension 
between what students believe and what they are expected to know.  For instance, some students 
believe that the diversity of life on Earth can be explained on the basis of religion. However, 
science teachers expect students to know evidence and arguments for biologists’ position that 
evolution explains genetic changes that occur in a population over time.   
It is important for students to understand content, independently of their beliefs.  
Achieving this aim can be difficult because topic beliefs can affect how people process belief-
related information in a variety of ways (Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014; Wolfe, Tanner, & 
Taylor, 2013).  For instance, individuals may primarily focus on information that reinforces their 
beliefs (e.g., Hart et al., 2009), primarily focus on information that challenges their beliefs in an 
attempt to disconfirm it (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Wolfe et al., 2013), 
or focus on both information that reinforces and challenges their beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006).   
Given that reading is a primary means of school-based learning, and that reading 
processes are related to memory (e.g., Goldman & Varma, 1995; Kintsch, 1998; McNamara & 
Magliano, 2009), it is important to identify ways to promote students’ understanding of belief-
related information.  As one example, if students only focus on information that reinforces 
beliefs, they may fail to understand information that challenges their beliefs.  Therefore, it is 
important to investigate ways to promote student understanding of belief-related text.  The 
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purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of task relevance instructions and topic beliefs 
on moment-by-moment reading processes and memory for belief-related text. 
Goal Focusing Model 
Task relevance instructions orient readers to an assigned reading task, such as when a 
teacher asks students to read a text for a particular purpose (Gil, Bråten, Vidal-Abarca, & 
Strømsø, 2010; Vidal-Abarca, Mañá, & Gil, 2010).  For example, a teacher may ask students to 
read a dual-position text to help them understand two sides of a controversial issue.  In such a 
situation, the teacher may give students additional instructions to help direct their attention, 
which can affect how they process and recall the text (McCrudden, Magliano, & Schraw, 2010; 
Rouet & Britt, 2011; van den Broek, Bohn-Gettler, Kendeou, Carlson, & White, 2011; van den 
Broek, Lorch, Linderholm, & Gustafson, 2001). 
The goal-focusing model of relevance describes the events that take place when students 
are given task instructions for an assigned reading task (McCrudden, Magliano, & Schraw, 2011; 
McCrudden & Schraw, 2007).  When a reading task is assigned, relevance cues and reader 
intentions can affect online reading processes and offline products (i.e., changes in memory or 
learning that result from reading).  Relevance cues are signals communicated by an external 
source (e.g., teacher) that indicate the extent to which information is relevant to a task, such as 
instructions to focus on specific types of information.  These cues are meant to help readers 
determine how to process the text while they read and how they may use information after they 
read.  However, reader intentions can affect how readers process and remember text.  When 
given assigned reading tasks, readers bring their knowledge, beliefs, values, expectations, and 
experiences, which can affect their decisions about what and how to process text information. 
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Relevance cues and reader intentions jointly affect readers’ standards of relevance.  
Standards of relevance are the criteria readers use to determine the relevance, or instrumental 
value, of ideas in a text in relation to their goals (McCrudden et al., 2010).  A segment that has 
greater perceived value is deemed more relevant, whereas a segment that has less perceived 
value is deemed less relevant.  Moreover, information that a reader perceives to be relevant to a 
goal may be different from information that is important to the coherence of the text 
(McCrudden & Schraw, 2007; Schraw, Wade, & Kardash, 1993) or what a teacher, for example, 
considers to be important (Alexander & Jetton, 2000).  Thus, goals could reflect relevance cues, 
reader intentions, or both.  Therefore, standards of relevance may lead one to focus on and 
process information from a text, and this focus may differ from the purpose for which the text 
was written, or may differ from the originally assigned task.  Readers’ goals and standards of 
relevance affect how they allocate attention and their use of strategic processing during reading, 
such that they tend to allocate more attention to goal-relevant information and utilize effortful 
strategic processing activities when reading this information (Kaakinen & Hyönä, 2011; 
Kaakinen, Hyönä, & Keenan, 2002; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007).  Further, the mental model 
that results from reading tends to reflect information that is deemed more relevant to readers’ 
goals.   
Nonetheless, readers who are given the same task instructions and read the same text may 
develop different goals, process the text differently, and construct different mental 
representations of the text.  For instance, in McCrudden et al. (2010), undergraduates read a text 
about several countries, and were asked to focus on information about a specific country.  
Collectively, participants spent more time reading task-relevant information, and they 
remembered this information better than task-irrelevant information.  However, follow-up 
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interviews indicated that participants implemented task instructions differently, such that some 
students focused exclusively on task-relevant information, whereas others focused on both task-
relevant and task-irrelevant information.  Reading time and recall data corroborated the interview 
data.  Thus, readers do not uniformly use task instructions for reading.   
This underscores the idea that many factors can influence how readers approach texts in 
educational settings (Bohn-Gettler & Kendeou, 2014; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007; Rapp & van 
den Broek, 2005; van den Broek, Risden, & Husebye-Hartmann, 1995), and that task instructions 
do not uniformly affect readers’ strategies.  Readers can develop different goals and processing 
strategies in response to the same task instructions (Kendeou, Bohn-Gettler, & Fulton, 2011; 
McCrudden et al., 2010). One factor, topic beliefs, may play an important role in how readers 
enact explicit task instructions. 
Topic Beliefs 
A belief is an idea that a person accepts to be true, but that does not require verification 
from others (Murphy & Mason, 2006).  Beliefs held about particular topics (i.e., topic beliefs) 
can affect online processes and offline products; however, previous research shows that results 
differ regarding when and how this may occur.  Edwards and Smith (1996) found that 
participants spent more time reading belief-inconsistent arguments.  After reading, they listed 
more refutational statements for belief-inconsistent arguments, but listed more supportive 
statements for belief-consistent arguments.  Similarly, in Kardash and Howell (2000), 
participants who thought-aloud while reading a dual-position text tended to refute, disagree with, 
or make more judgements about belief-inconsistent information than belief-consistent 
information.  Taber and Lodge (2006) found that participants spent more time on belief-
consistent information.  In contrast, Maier and Richter (2013) found that readers had longer 
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reading times for belief-inconsistent information when texts were presented in block format (i.e., 
one position presented in its entirety before the other position).  Nonetheless, these readers 
encoded belief-inconsistent and belief-consistent texts differently.  Readers more accurately 
identified paraphrases for belief-inconsistent information, but more accurately identified 
inferences about belief-consistent information on a sentence recognition task.  However, these 
online and offline differences did not occur when the texts were interleaved.  Wolfe et al. (2013) 
found that argument strength primarily affected reading time, independently of whether the 
arguments were consistent with participants’ beliefs. Thus, topic beliefs can affect online 
processes and offline products, but there are differences in how and when this occurs.  
Nonetheless, previous research indicates that task instructions can affect how readers 
process content independently of their beliefs.  Maier and Richter (2015) asked undergraduates 
to read belief-related texts for the purpose of summarizing the text or generating an argument.  
When asked to summarize, participants tended to use memorization strategies for belief-
consistent information, and spent more time reading this information.  Conversely, when asked 
to generate an argument, reading times for belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent information 
did not differ; however, participants made more elaborations when reading belief-inconsistent 
texts, which coincided with better comprehension of belief-inconsistent information.  Thus, task 
instructions can affect how readers process belief-related content. 
Overview of the Present Study 
The purpose of this study was to use the three-pronged approach (Magliano & Graesser, 
1991) to investigate the effects of task relevance instructions and topic beliefs on reading 
processes and memory for text.  We used theory, processing data (i.e., reading times and verbal 
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protocols), and recall data to investigate online processes and offline products when individuals 
read belief-related text.  
In Experiment 1, participants read the text silently via computer and then recalled the 
text.  Reading time per text segment was recorded.  We used a reading time methodology to 
capture both strategic and automatic reading processes.  In Experiment 2, we used a think-aloud 
methodology to assess the types of processes readers use when they read task-relevant and task-
irrelevant information, and participants recalled the text after they read.  Although a think-aloud 
methodology is more intrusive than a reading time methodology, reading time does not reveal 
the cognitive processes readers use during reading. Thus, reading time and think-aloud data 
together provided a more comprehensive assessment of reading processes than either 
methodology alone (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007; Magliano & Graesser, 1991).   
We chose the topic of intelligent design (an argument for an intelligent creator of life on 
earth, often interpreted as a God) because many people hold beliefs on the topic, and the 
sentences in the text could be separated into two discrete categories; sentences that support and 
sentences that oppose teaching ID in science classrooms. When two categories of sentences 
differ with respect to belief-consistency, it is possible to determine whether task instructions 
affect how readers process and remember belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent information. 
The present study aims to extend previous research in two main ways.  First, we applied 
the three-pronged approach (Magliano & Graesser, 1991) to examine both online processes and 
offline memory associated with reading an extended belief-related text. To accomplish this, we 
used both reading time and think-aloud data to more clearly investigate moment-by-moment 
online processing of an extended text, and recall data to investigate offline products of reading.  
Previous research has used reading times for single-sentence arguments of unrelated topics 
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(Edwards & Smith, 1996), which may lead to different types of processing than connected 
discourse on the same topic.  Research has also used post-reading thought listing tasks (Edwards 
& Smith, 1996), which may differ from moment-by-moment processing.  Think-aloud protocols 
allow readers to articulate thoughts at the time in which they occur rather than retrospectively 
after reading.  This is important for measuring thoughts for extended discourse, because memory 
for specific thoughts across an entire text may be more accessible during reading and less subject 
to memory difficulties that may occur after reading.  The reading time methodology enabled us 
to assess time spent reading different categories of text information and rule out differences in 
memory as a result of time spent reading.  The think-aloud methodology enabled us to assess 
overt cognitive processes that may have occurred and corresponded to reading time data.  That 
is, the reading time and think-aloud methodologies enabled us to investigate strategic and 
automatic reading processes differently.  Experiment 1 examined reading times and recall, 
whereas Experiment 2 examined think-alouds and recall. 
Second, we used task instructions to target specific categories of information.  
Conversely, Maier and Richter (2015) used general task instructions that asked participants to 
read for a particular purpose (i.e., read to summarize or read to form an argument).  General 
instructions allow readers to interpret general, less-specific task instructions with greater 
variability.  However, the current study utilized specific instructions that focused readers on 
particular categories of information.  Readers may respond differently to specific task 
instructions because specific instructions provide more explicit criteria for distinguishing 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information. 
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Experiment 1         
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effects of topic beliefs and task 
instructions on reading time and memory.  Topic beliefs were used to determine belief/task-
alignment; that is, the combination of whether the readers’ task instructions were to focus on 
belief-consistent information (if the task instructions targeted belief-consistent information, there 
was a belief/task-match), belief-inconsistent information (if the task instructions targeted 
information that was inconsistent with a reader’s beliefs, there was a belief/task-mismatch), or 
belief-neutral information (if the reader was ambivalent about the topic, the instructions were 
belief/task-neutral). 
On the one hand, task instructions might affect readers’ online processing and offline 
products independently of their beliefs.  The task instructions could give readers criteria for 
determining the extent to which text segments are relevant to their task, which may lead to 
longer reading times for and better recall of task-relevant information compared to task-
irrelevant information (Kaakinen & Hyönä, 2005, 2011; Kaakinen et al., 2002; Kaakinen, Hyönä, 
& Keenan, 2003; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007, 2010).  If this is the case, participants in the 
belief/task-match group should spend more time on belief-consistent information and remember 
this information better than belief-inconsistent information.  And, participants in the belief/task-
mismatch group should spend more time on belief-inconsistent information and remember this 
information better than belief-consistent information. 
On the other hand, task instructions might not affect readers’ online processing and 
offline products.  Rather, beliefs may exert a more powerful influence than task instructions, and 
could affect processing and memory in at least two ways.  First, individuals might attempt to 
bolster their beliefs through selective exposure to belief-consistent information by attempting to 
Running head: TASK INSTRUCTIONS & BELIEFS  11 
 
confirm the information (Hart et al., 2009).  If this is the case, participants should have longer 
reading times and better memory for belief-consistent than belief-inconsistent text, 
independently of whether the information is task-relevant.  Alternatively, individuals might 
attempt to bolster their beliefs through selective exposure to belief-inconsistent information by 
attempting to disconfirm the information (Edwards & Smith, 1996).  If this is the case, 
participants should have longer reading times and better memory for belief-inconsistent than 
belief-consistent text, independently of whether the information is task-relevant. 
Method 
Participants and context.  Participants were 93 undergraduates (50.5% female) at a 
medium-sized public university in Kansas, located in the Midwestern part of the United States.  
The mean age in years was 23.3 (SD = 8.3).   Participants were recruited from psychology and 
education classes, and received course credit for their involvement in the study.   
Debate about the teaching of evolution and creationism (e.g., intelligent design) has a 
history in Kansas.  For instance, in 2005, the Kansas State Board of Education (KSBE) approved 
a draft of science curriculum standards requiring evolutionary theory and intelligent design be 
taught for equal amounts of time in science classrooms (although this draft was eventually 
rejected).  As recently as 2013, an anti-evolution group sued the KSBE for including science 
curriculum that teaches evolution on the ground that excluding ID from science classrooms 
discriminates against religion.  Thus, this topic was relevant to the general context in which the 
study was conducted. 
Design and conditions.  Figure 1 displays the study design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to task instructions, to either focus on arguments for or against teaching ID in science 
classrooms.  We also collected a measure of participants’ pre-existing beliefs about whether ID 
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should be taught in science classrooms (and beliefs were categorized as for, against, or neutral 
toward the topic).  In this way, we were able determine whether participants’ beliefs aligned or 
did not align with their task instructions (i.e., belief/task-alignment).  Hence, belief consistency 
as a variable was measured by the combination of task instructions and pre-existing topic beliefs.  
For instance, if a participant believed ID should be taught, and the task instructions targeted 
arguments for teaching ID, for arguments were relevant and consistent with participants’ beliefs, 
resulting in a match between beliefs and task instructions.  However, if a participant believed ID 
should be taught, and the task instructions targeted arguments against teaching ID, against 
arguments were relevant but inconsistent with participants’ beliefs, resulting in a mismatch 
between beliefs and task instructions.  If a person was neutral toward the topic of teaching ID, 
the belief/task-alignment was neutral (regardless of the task instructions).  
We also determined whether each text segment was relevant or irrelevant to the task 
instructions.  For instance, if the task instructions targeted arguments for teaching ID, text 
segments arguing for teaching ID were task-relevant, whereas text segments arguing against 
teaching ID were task-irrelevant.   Taken together, we used a 3 (belief/task-alignment: match, 
mismatch, vs. neutral; between subjects) x 2 (text segment type: task-relevant vs. task-irrelevant; 
within subject) mixed model design.   
Participants were randomly assigned to a task instruction condition before beliefs were 
measured; therefore, there was an uneven distribution of participants for the different levels of 
belief/task-alignment.  Table 1 provides the number of participants as a function of task 
instructions and beliefs.  Also, three participants’ data were removed from the study, and two 
participants did not answer the question assessing their beliefs (described later).  This design 
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produced three conditions: (a) belief/task-match (n = 25), (b) belief/task-mismatch (n = 33), (c) 
belief/task-neutral (n = 30).   
Materials. 
Topic beliefs.  The topic beliefs instrument measured participants’ beliefs about whether 
intelligent design should be taught in science classrooms.  Participants read the following 
background information: “Intelligent design (ID) is an argument for the existence of a creator for 
life on Earth, often interpreted as a God.  According to the Discovery Institute, ID is the view 
that ‘certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent 
cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.’”  Next they rated their agreement 
with the following statement, “I think intelligent design should be taught in science classrooms” 
on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree; 9 = strongly disagree).  Responses were used 
to determine whether participants were more-accepting of (n = 29; ratings of 1 through 3), 
neutral/ambivalent towards (n = 30; ratings of 4 through 6), or less-accepting of (n = 29; ratings 
of 7 through 9) ID being taught in science classrooms.  Two participants did not answer the topic 
belief question. 
Text. The text described arguments for and against teaching ID in science classrooms 
(1427 words, Flesch-Kincaid grade level 12.2) and was a composite of various arguments from 
articles and blogs on the Internet.  The introduction (8 sentences, 158 words) began by 
introducing the topic and indicated that some people think ID should be taught in science classes, 
whereas others do not, and that the text included arguments for both sides of the issue. 
Each argument began with a claim (e.g., some people are in support of/opposition to 
teaching ID) and a reason (e.g., ID is not an empirical scientific theory, and hence does not 
belong in science classrooms), followed by a detailed explanation of the reason.  The four 
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arguments for teaching ID consisted of 26 sentences (620 words), and the four arguments against 
teaching ID consisted of 27 sentences (626 words).  An argument in favor of teaching ID was 
followed by an argument against it, although successive arguments were not necessarily related 
(i.e., the text did not follow an argument-counterargument structure).  This was done to minimize 
text-belief consistency bias, because integrated (i.e., interleaved) formats reduce belief-
consistency effects in comparison to blocked formats (Maier & Richter, 2013; Wiley, 2005).  
The text concluded with a one-sentence statement (23 words) indicating that the issue would 
likely continue to be controversial. 
Apparatus. The experiment was conducted utilizing a Dell desktop computer with E-
Prime software (E-Prime, Psychological Software Tools, Inc.).  Participants sat at a desk in front 
of a color monitor, and rested their right hand on the mouse.  The text was presented in standard 
lower- and upper-case type, and was centered on the screen.   
Procedure. Each participant completed the session independently.  Participants first 
completed the topic belief instrument. Then, they read a practice text, in which phrases were 
presented one at a time, on a computer screen.  A phrase was defined as a sentence or partial 
sentence that contained a subject and verb, and that communicated one idea (i.e., Kendeou, 
Bohn-Gettler, White, & van den Broek, 2008). Participants proceeded from one phrase to the 
next, at their own pace, by pressing the mouse button with their right index finger.  They were 
not able to re-read prior text. Reading times in milliseconds (ms) were collected.  
Next, participants were randomly assigned a task instruction condition. The two task 
instruction conditions were to either to focus on arguments for or focus on arguments against 
teaching ID in science classrooms.  All participants were informed that they would read a text 
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about reasons for and against teaching ID in science classrooms and then complete a 
comprehension task after reading.  
After they read, participants were asked to verbally retell the text as if they were speaking 
to a fellow student who had not read the text.  No other instructions were provided for the 
retelling in an effort to minimize demand characteristics.  The experimenter provided no prompts 
other than to ask at the end of the recall, “Would you like to add anything else?”  Responses 
were audio recorded and transcribed.  
Screening of reading time data. Reading times less than 10ms, or greater than 3 SD 
above the mean were removed, resulting in removal of 1.6% of the data. Descriptive analyses 
identified two participants as outliers whose data were removed from the study. One participant’s 
overall reading time was 3 SD above the mean, and one’s overall reading times was 2 SD below 
the mean.  Another participant’s data was removed due to self-reported vision issues and loud 
construction noises that interfered with reading. Finally, two participants did not answer the topic 
belief question. 
Coding of recall data. Three researchers parsed the participants’ recall transcripts into 
idea units, generally defined as subject-verb phrases that communicated one idea (Kendeou et al., 
2008). Because a sentence could convey multiple ideas, several idea units could occur within a 
sentence.  Hence, this provided a more accurate measure of the number of ideas from a text the 
participant included in their recall.  The participants’ idea units were matched to the 
corresponding idea within the text (the text contained 165 possible ideas: 21 
introduction/conclusion, 71 related to pro arguments, and 73 related to against arguments).  If the 
participant included an idea unit more than once, it was only counted once to ensure that only 
unique ideas were included. This gave us a better indication of how many unique ideas from 
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each respective position that participants recalled. Although we scored for the entirety of the text, 
we only analyzed the percentage of unique ideas recalled for the eight arguments, and not the 
neutral introductory or conclusion content.  Hence, we broke down the percentage recalled by 
whether the text was relevant or irrelevant to their task instructions.  The experimental conditions 
of the participants were masked to the raters during the coding process.  The percentage 
agreement among raters was 91% (Fleiss’ kappa = .79).  
Results 
We conducted a separate 3 x 2 mixed model univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) 
with belief/task-alignment (which represented the combination of task instructions and 
participants’ pre-existing beliefs: match, mismatch, or neutral) as a between-subjects variable, 
and segment type (task-relevant or task-irrelevant) as a within-subject variable on reading time 
and recall. ANOVAs are fairly robust for accounting for unequal sample sizes, but we report the 
Greenhouse-Geisser statistics to account for this.  We computed partial eta squared (η2) for the 
measurement of effect size, with partial η2 qualifying values of approximately 0.01 as small 
effects, values of 0.06 as medium effects, and values of approximately 0.14 or more as large 
effects (see Olejnik & Algina, 2000). All follow-up post-hoc tests utilized Tukey’s HSD, which 
controls for family wise error at the .05-level.  We only report post-hoc tests that were significant 
at the p < .05 level of significance unless otherwise noted.   
Reading times. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics related to the reading times, which 
are reported as time per word (ms)1.  We only analyzed reading times for the sentences 
containing arguments for or against teaching ID in science classrooms (i.e., excluded the 
                                                   
1 Analyses were also conducted utilizing reading times per syllable, as well as reading times per character.  In all 
instances, the pattern of results was the same as reading times per word.  We opted to report reading times per word 
for ease of interpretation. 
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introductory paragraph and the conclusion sentence at the end of the entire passage). The 
interaction was not significant [F(2, 85) = .52, p = .60, η2 = .01], nor were the main effects for 
belief/task-alignment [F(2, 85) = 2.24, p = .11,  η2 = .05] or text segment [F(1, 85) = 1.18, p = 
.28, η2 = .01]. 
Recall. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics related to the recall data, which are reported 
as proportion of unique text ideas recalled. There were 165 possible ideas in the text; participants 
recalled approximately 7-9% of the text (11 to 15 unique ideas).  The interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 85) = 1.61, p = .20, η2 = .04. The main effect for segment type was significant, 
F(1, 85) = 35.03, p < .001, η2 = .29.  Participants recalled more task-relevant segments than task-
irrelevant segments.  For instance, participants in the belief/task-match group recalled more task-
relevant information (which was belief-consistent) than task-irrelevant information (which was 
belief-inconsistent).  Similarly, participants in the belief/task-mismatch group also recalled more 
task-relevant information (which was belief-inconsistent) than task-irrelevant information (which 
was belief-consistent).  The main effect for belief/task-alignment was not significant, F(2, 85) = 
.90, p = .41, η2 = .02. 
Discussion 
There was no difference in reading time between task-relevant and task-irrelevant text; 
however, participants recalled task-relevant text better than task-irrelevant text independently of 
their pre-existing topic beliefs.  These findings indicate that task instructions promoted memory 
for task-relevant information, independently of whether the information conflicted with readers’ 
beliefs.  These differences in memory could not be attributed to longer reading times for task-
relevant information. One explanation for this outcome is that specific task instructions provide 
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readers with clear criteria for developing standards of relevance during reading and that such 
criteria facilitated memory for task-relevant information.    
These findings also suggest that one way to promote memory of information that differs 
from one’s beliefs is to ask the person to focus specifically on that information.  However, 
similarities in reading times do not necessarily indicate that participants engaged in similar 
reading processes (Magliano & Graesser, 1991).  Prior work has produced mixed effects with 
regard to the effects of beliefs on reading times.  For example, Maier and Richter found that 
reading times were longer for belief-consistent information when reading a blocked (but not 
interleaved) text (2013), or when reading with the goal of summarizing, but not when reading to 
build an argument (2015).  Wolfe et al. (2013) found that reading times varied as a function of 
the strength of arguments, not beliefs.  However, the present study found no effects for reading 
time, despite prior work that relevance instructions encourage readers to spend more time 
reading task-relevant information (Kaakinen & Hyönä, 2011; Kaakinen et al., 2002; McCrudden 
& Schraw, 2007).  The results from the present study therefore point to a need to understand why 
neither beliefs nor task instructions affected reading times, because even though reading times 
were similar for all groups, such similarities could be masking very different processes occurring 
during reading. It may be that participants applied different processes as a function of task 
instructions and beliefs, such as evaluations, text-, or knowledge-based inferences while reading 
belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent viewpoints (Maier & Richter, 2015). Therefore, we 
conducted a second experiment using a think-aloud methodology to investigate online reading 
processes. 
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Experiment 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate the effects of task instructions and topic 
beliefs on online processes using a think-aloud methodology and offline products via free recall.  
In think-aloud tasks, verbalized thoughts provide direct insights into readers’ moment-by-
moment cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Magliano, Trabasso, & Graesser, 1999).  
While many cognitive processes that occur during reading are automatic, proficient readers are 
typically aware of explanatory processes (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994) and tend to report 
them when thinking-aloud (Magliano & Millis, 2003; Magliano et al., 1999; Trabasso & 
Magliano, 1996).  Thinking-aloud has received extensive validation as a tool for revealing 
comprehension processes during reading (Coté & Goldman, 1999; Magliano et al., 1999; 
Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995).  The cognitive processes that can facilitate text comprehension 
include text rehearsal, making inferential connections between textual information, elaborating 
on text utilizing prior knowledge, evaluating the quality of text arguments, and more (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). 
We expected that task instructions would lead to better recall for task-relevant 
information across conditions.  This would lend further support for the effectiveness of task 
instructions on memory.  However, it was unclear what cognitive processes led to this outcome 
in Experiment 1, particularly given that reading times did not differ between task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant text.  There are at least four possible explanations. 
One possibility is that participants were motivated to disconfirm belief-inconsistent 
information, independently of task instructions.  If this was the case, refutational evaluations 
should be used more than supportive evaluations for belief-inconsistent text, whereas there 
should be no difference in their use for belief-consistent text.  Further, backward inferences and 
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elaborations should be used more at belief-inconsistent text than at belief-consistent text because 
participants are accessing textual information or prior knowledge to undermine belief-
inconsistent content (similar to Edwards & Smith, 1996).   
A second possibility is that participants were motivated to confirm belief-consistent 
information, independently of task instructions.  If this was the case, supportive evaluations 
should be used more than refutational evaluations at belief-consistent text, whereas there should 
be no difference in their use at belief-inconsistent text.  Further, backward inferences and 
elaborations should be used more at belief-consistent text than at belief-inconsistent text because 
participants are accessing textual information or prior knowledge to bolster belief-consistent 
content (aligning with research involving rating the quality of arguments, such as Edwards & 
Smith, 1996; Hart et al., 2009; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Taber & Lodge, 2006).   
A third possibility is that participants were motivated to both disconfirm belief-
inconsistent text and confirm belief-consistent text, independently of task instructions (e.g., 
Taber & Lodge, 2006).  If this is the case, refutational evaluations should be used at belief-
inconsistent text, whereas supportive evaluations should be used at belief-consistent text.  There 
should be no differences in the use of bridging inferences or elaborations for belief-inconsistent 
and belief-consistent text.   
A fourth possibility is that participants’ engaged in differential think-aloud processes as a 
function of task instructions, but not beliefs. And, the differential processes embodied 
themselves in similar reading times. If this is the case, participants may provide supportive 
evaluations for task-relevant text, and refutational evaluations for task-irrelevant text, 
independently of their pre-existing beliefs. This possibility seemed most likely for the 
belief/task-neutral groups given they were generally ambivalent about the topic.  For the 
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belief/task-match and belief/task-mismatch groups, any of the previously described possibilities 
could emerge.  
Method 
Participants and context.  Participants were 80 undergraduates (65% female) from the 
same medium-sized public university in the US state of Kansas as in Experiment 1.  None of the 
participants from Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2.  The mean age in years was 23.6 
(SD = 8.01).  
Design and conditions.  The design and conditions were the same as used in Experiment 
1. We used a 3 (belief/task-alignment: match, mismatch, vs. neutral) x 2 (segment type: relevant 
vs. irrelevant to task instructions) mixed model design.  Table 1 provides the number of 
participants as a function of task instructions and beliefs.   As before, there was an uneven 
distribution of participants for the different levels of belief/task-alignment.  The design produced 
three conditions: (a) belief/task-match (n = 31), (b) belief/task-mismatch (n = 23), and (c) 
belief/task-neutral (n = 22). 
Materials. 
Topic beliefs.  The topic beliefs instrument was the same as used in Experiment 1.  
Responses were used to determine whether participants were more-accepting of (n = 20), 
neutral/ambivalent towards (n = 24), or less-accepting of (n = 36) ID being taught in science 
classrooms. 
Text. The text was the same text as used in Experiment 1.  
Procedure. Each participant completed the session independently.  The procedure was 
similar to Experiment 1 with one main difference: Instead of reading the text silently, the 
participants thought-aloud about the text.  Participants first completed the topic belief instrument 
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and then did a practice think-aloud task.  Some sentences were marked by stars (***) indicating 
that the participant was required to think-aloud at that particular sentence; however, they were 
free to think-aloud at any point. The stars occurred after the last sentence of the introduction, 
after the first sentence of each argument section (in which the main idea of the argument was 
presented), and after the final summative sentence of the text (which contained neutral content).  
Hence, the stars were equally spread across the arguments.  Each paragraph was presented on 
one page, but each sentence was numbered and presented on its own line. The experimenter 
modelled reading a text aloud, sentence-by-sentence, and verbally stated his or her thoughts after 
each sentence for the first half of the practice text. The experimenter demonstrated various 
productions, with examples drawn from a rubric developed to exemplify most possible processes 
(including elaborations, evaluations, text rehearsal, and backward inferences).  For the second 
half of the practice text, participants practiced reading and thinking aloud. If the participant 
forgot to think out loud at a starred sentence, the experimenter asked a non-leading question, 
such as “What are you thinking after you read this sentence?”  The experimenter did not answer 
questions or decode words (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
Next, participants were randomly assigned either: (a) to focus on arguments for (n = 40), 
or (b) to focus on arguments against (n = 40) teaching ID in science classrooms.  They received 
the same instructions as described in Experiment 1.  Participants proceeded to think-aloud about 
the text in the same manner as described for the practice text.  After reading, participants recalled 
the text using the same method as described in Experiment 1, and responses were recorded and 
transcribed. 
Coding of think-aloud data. Participants’ think-aloud responses were parsed into idea 
units and coded by three raters.  The experimental conditions of the participants were masked to 
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the raters.  The response categories were adapted from Bohn-Gettler and Rapp (2011). This 
analysis specifically focused on evaluations, backward inferences, and elaborations. We focused 
on these processes because they can encourage comprehension beyond text rehearsal (van den 
Broek et al., 2001), have been implicated in previous research on beliefs (Maier & Richter, 
2015), and occurred frequently enough in the data to warrant analyses.  Evaluations occurred 
when participants stated opinions about the content of the text, and were further coded as 
supportive, refutational, or neutral toward the text segment.  Backward inferences occurred when 
participants referred to information presented in earlier sentences that was relevant or explained 
the current sentence. Elaborations occurred when participants retrieved relevant background 
knowledge to help explain the current sentence or idea. Other think-aloud processes coded, but 
not included in the focal analysis, included text rehearsal, predictive inferences, associations, 
monitoring, affective responses, non-responses, and an “other” category.  See Table 4 for 
definitions and examples of participant responses for each think-aloud category.  Interrater 
agreement was 89% (Fleiss’ kappa = .75).  Any disagreements between the raters were resolved 
via discussion.   
The number of times participants engaged in each think-aloud process was tabulated. 
Because each participant engaged in a different number of processes, the overall proportion with 
which participants engaged in each process was computed (number of responses for a specific 
process divided by the total number of processes produced by the participant).  For example, if a 
participant elaborated two times, but generated a total number of 23 processes, the proportion 
with which they elaborated would be 8.70% (i.e., 2/23).  A number of processes occurred in less 
than 1% of the responses and were removed from analyses (a loss of 1.64% of the data, including 
predictive inferences (.10%), questions (.10%), associations (.70%), affective responses (.70%), 
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and no response (.04%).  Data from four participants were also removed from the analysis. One 
reported being on medication causing drowsiness, one was a non-native English speaker, one 
reported a learning disability, and one experienced loud construction noises during the session 
that interfered with reading. 
We ran Pearson correlations between the processes (see Table 5).  With respect to the 
focal processes, elaborations negatively correlated with backward inferences (r = -.28, p < .05).  
The correlations indicated no statistically significant positive relations between the remaining 
variables, suggesting each processing category was independent.   
Coding of recall data. The recall transcripts were parsed and coded as in Experiment 1.  
The experimental conditions of the participants were masked to the raters. The percentage 
agreement among raters was 93% (Fleiss’ kappa = .81). 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted separate 3 x 2 mixed model univariate analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) with belief/task-alignment (the combination of task instructions and pre-
existing beliefs: match, mismatch, or neutral) as a between-subjects variable, and segment type 
(task-relevant or task-irrelevant) as a within-subject variable on the recall and think-aloud data. 
We again used the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment. We computed partial eta squared (η2) for the 
measurement of effect size.  All follow-up post-hoc tests used Tukey’s HSD, which controls for 
family wise error at the .05-level.  We only report post-hoc tests that were significant at the p < 
.05 level of significance unless otherwise noted. 
 Think-alouds. Table 6 contains descriptive statistics2 related to the think-aloud data. 
These data are reported as the proportion with which participants engaged in each process.   
                                                   
2
 We ran analyses with the non-focal processes.  For text rehearsal, the main effect of text segment was approaching 
significance, F(1, 73) = 2.95, p = .09, η2 = .04.  Participants engaged in numerically more text rehearsal for task-
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Evaluations. The main effects for segment type [F(1, 73) = .31, p = .58, η2 = .004] and 
belief/task-alignment [F(2, 73) = .35, p = .70,  η2 = .01] were not significant, nor was the 
interaction significant [F(2, 73) = .55, p = .58, η2 = .01].  However, to gain a better 
understanding of readers’ use of evaluations, we coded each evaluation as being supportive, 
refutational, or impartial toward the content of the segment. Then, we computed the proportional 
use of each type of evaluation for each participant (e.g., the number of supportive evaluations 
generated was divided by the total number of evaluations generated3).  We ran a 2 (segment type: 
task-relevant or task-irrelevant) x 3 (belief/task-alignment: match, mismatch, neutral) for each 
type of evaluation.  Examining refutational versus supportive evaluations enabled us to directly 
test for possible belief-consistency patterns. That is, given that particular text segments were 
either task-relevant or task-irrelevant, it was possible to investigate whether these segments were 
processed differently as a function of topic beliefs.  For instance, do readers process task-relevant 
segments differently when they are belief-consistent versus when they are belief-inconsistent? 
Supportive Evaluations. The main effects for text segment, F(1, 73) = 8.94, p = .004, η2 = 
.11, and belief/task-alignment were significant, F(1, 73) = 3.99, p < .05, η2 = .10.  However, 
these main effects were qualified by the significant interaction between text segment and 
belief/task-alignment, F(2, 73) = 22.69, p < .001, η2 = .38 (see Figure 2).  Post-hoc tests 
indicated that readers used supportive evaluations for text segments differently based on belief-
task alignment.  When the text segment was task-relevant and there was a match between 
belief/task-alignment (i.e., task-relevant segments were belief-consistent), participants provided 
                                                   
relevant than task-irrelevant text. All other main effects and interactions for text rehearsal, monitoring, and the 
“other” category were not significant (F’s ≤ 1.36, p’s ≥ .28). 
 
3 We divided by the total number of evaluations generated because we were interested in examining different 
subtypes of evaluations.  However, we also ran the analyses with the denominator as the total number of think aloud 
processes in general, and obtained similar results. 
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more supportive evaluations for task-relevant segments (belief-consistent) than for task-
irrelevant segments (belief-inconsistent; p < .01).  However, when the text segment was task-
relevant and there was a mismatch between belief/task-alignment (i.e., task-relevant segments 
were belief-inconsistent), participants provided fewer supportive evaluations for task-relevant 
segments (belief-inconsistent) than for task-irrelevant segments (belief-consistent; p < .01).  
Further, when a text segment was task-relevant, and the reader had neutral beliefs (belief/task-
neutral), participants provided more supportive evaluations for task-relevant segments than for 
task-irrelevant segments (p < .01).   
For task-relevant text, the belief/task-match group provided more supportive evaluations 
than the other groups (p’s < .01), and the belief/task-neutral group provided more supportive 
evaluations than the belief/task-mismatch group (p < .01).  For task-irrelevant text, the 
belief/task-mismatch group provided more supportive evaluations than the other groups (p’s < 
.01).   
Refutational Evaluations.  Neither the main effect for text segment F(1, 73) = 3.59, p = 
.06, η2 = .05, nor the main effect for belief/task-alignment, F(2, 73) = .27, p = .76, η2 = .01, were 
significant. However, the interaction was significant, F(2, 73) = 19.73, p < .001, η2 = .35 (as 
illustrated in Figure 3).  Post-hoc tests indicated that readers used refutational evaluations for text 
segments differently based on belief-task alignment.  When the text segment was task-relevant 
and there was a match between belief/task-alignment (i.e., task-relevant segments were belief-
consistent), participants provided fewer refutational evaluations for task-relevant segments 
(belief-consistent) than for task-irrelevant segments (belief-inconsistent; p < .01).  However, 
when the text segment was task-relevant, and there was a mismatch between belief/task-
alignment (i.e., task-relevant segments were belief-inconsistent), participants provided more 
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refutational evaluations for task-relevant segments (belief-inconsistent) than for task-irrelevant 
segments (belief-consistent; p < .01).  Further, when a text segment was task-relevant, and the 
reader had neutral beliefs (belief/task-neutral), participants provided fewer refutational 
evaluations for task-relevant segments than for task-irrelevant segments (p < .01).   
For task-relevant text, the belief/task-mismatch group (for whom the task-relevant text 
was belief-inconsistent) provided more refutational evaluations than the other groups (p’s < .01). 
For task-irrelevant text, the belief/task-mismatch group (for whom the task-relevant text was 
belief-consistent) provided fewer refutational evaluations than the other groups (p’s < .01).   
Impartial Evaluations. The main effect of text segment was significant, F(1, 73) = 4.24, p 
< .05, η2 = .05.  Participants used more impartial evaluations for task-irrelevant than task-
relevant segments. The main effect of belief/task-alignment was significant, F(1, 73) = 3.24, p < 
.05, η2 = .08.  The belief/task-neutral group provided more impartial evaluations than the 
belief/task-match group (p = .05) and numerically more than the belief/task-mismatch group (p = 
.11).  The interaction was not significant, F(2, 73) = .44, p = .65, η2 = .01.    
Backward Inferences. Neither the main effects for text segment [F(1, 73) = .28, p = .60, 
η2 = .004] nor belief/task-alignment were significant [F(2, 73) = .27, p = .77, η2 = .01].  
However, the interaction between text segment and belief/task-alignment was significant (as 
illustrated in Figure 4), F(2, 73) = 3.53, p < .05, η2 = .09. When the text was task-irrelevant, the 
belief/task-match group (for whom the task-irrelevant text was belief-inconsistent) provided 
more backward inferences than the belief/task-mismatch group (for whom the task-irrelevant text 
was belief-consistent) or for the belief/task-neutral group (p’s < .01).   
Elaborations.  The main effect of text segment was significant, F(1, 73) =5.33 , p < .05, 
η2 = .07.  Participants provided more elaborations for task-irrelevant text segments than for task-
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relevant text segments.  The main effect of belief/task-alignment was not significant, F(2, 73) = 
.80, p = .45, η2 = .02, nor was the interaction, F(2, 73) = 1.59, p = .21, η2 = .04.   
Recall. Table 7 contains descriptive statistics related to the recall data, which are reported 
as the proportion of unique text ideas recalled.  The main effect of text segment was significant, 
F(1, 73) = 7.98, p < .01 η2 = .10.  Participants recalled task-relevant segments to a greater extent 
than task-irrelevant segments.  The main effect of belief/task alignment was significant, F(2, 73) 
= 3.04, p = .05, η2 = .08.  Participants in the belief/task-neutral group recalled more segments 
than participants in the belief/task-mismatch group (p < .05).  No other post-hoc comparisons 
were significant.  The interaction was not significant, F(2, 73) = 1.37, p = .26, η2 = .04.   
Discussion 
For the think-alouds, readers’ beliefs influenced online processes more than task 
instructions.  Students in the belief/task-match group used supportive evaluations more than 
refutational evaluations for task-relevant text (which was belief-consistent), whereas they used 
refutational evaluations more than supportive evaluations for task-irrelevant text (which was 
belief-inconsistent).  Students in the belief/task-mismatch group used refutational evaluations 
more than supportive evaluation for task-relevant text (which was belief-inconsistent), whereas 
they used supportive evaluations more than refutational evaluations for task-irrelevant text 
(which was belief-consistent).  Thus, readers’ use of evaluations was driven by whether the text 
was belief-consistent rather than whether the text was task-relevant. 
Further, students in the belief/task-match group were more likely to generate backward 
inferences for task-irrelevant text (which was belief-inconsistent) text than the other readers, 
lending partial support for a disconfirmation strategy.  These data suggest that individuals sought 
to both confirm belief-consistent text and disconfirm belief-inconsistent text.  Nonetheless, 
Running head: TASK INSTRUCTIONS & BELIEFS  29 
 
participants were more likely to generate elaborations for task-irrelevant text than for task-
relevant text independently of whether the information was belief-consistent. 
For the recall data, task-relevant information was recalled better than task-irrelevant 
information across all groups.  This is consistent with the results from Experiment 1, and 
suggests that task instructions affected memory for text, independently of beliefs.  However, 
beliefs still played a role in recall.  Participants in the belief/task-neutral groups recalled more 
text than participants asked to focus on content inconsistent with their beliefs (the belief/task-
mismatch group).   
Conclusions and General Discussion 
We used the three-pronged approach (Magliano & Graesser, 1991) to investigate the 
effects task instructions and topic beliefs on moment-by-moment processing of and memory for  
belief-related text.  This approach allowed us to examine the association between online reading 
processes and memory (Rapp & van den Broek, 2005), as well as how reading time data can 
potentially mask differential processing.  In Experiments 1 and 2, participants recalled task-
relevant information better than task-irrelevant information independently of whether the 
information was belief-consistent.  However, Experiment 1 showed that there were no 
differences in reading times as a function of belief/task-alignment, whereas Experiment 2 
showed differences in the nature of reading processes as a function of belief/task-alignment.  
When participants held stronger beliefs, topic beliefs overrode task instructions during reading, 
whereas participants who held neutral beliefs enacted task instructions in a more uniform 
manner.  The findings suggest that topic beliefs exerted a greater influence on online processing 
of belief-related text, whereas task instructions exerted a greater influence on memory for belief-
related text. 
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The reading time, think-aloud, and recall data each provided different information.  
Although reading times were not affected by beliefs or task instructions, think-aloud processing 
varied as a function of beliefs, such that participants appeared motivated to protect their beliefs.  
For instance, refutational evaluations were used more than supportive evaluations at belief-
inconsistent text, whereas supportive evaluations were used more than refutational evaluations at 
belief-consistent text, independently task instructions.  Thus, although reading times for belief-
consistent and belief-inconsistent segments did not differ, the think-aloud data indicated 
differences in the processes readers used while reading these segments. 
When readers had neutral beliefs, they provided more supportive evaluations than 
refutational evaluations when they read task-relevant text, and more refutational evaluations than 
supportive evaluations when they read task-irrelevant text.  This suggests that task instructions 
may have affected the valence of the information (McCrudden et al., 2010). In addition, all 
participants provided more elaborations for task-irrelevant text segments than for task-relevant 
text segments.  If the task instructions indeed affected the valence of the information, the 
elaboration of task-irrelevant text segments is consistent with previous research in which 
individuals more carefully scrutinize belief-inconsistent arguments (i.e., disconfirmation bias; 
Edwards & Smith, 1996). 
However, recall varied as a function of task instructions, such that participants recalled 
task-relevant information to a greater extent than task-irrelevant information, independently of 
whether the information was belief-consistent.  This suggests that the expectation that task-
relevant information would be needed on the post-reading task facilitated recall of this 
information.  This finding is consistent with research which has shown that reader expectations 
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about post-reading assessment can affect memory, even when asked to focus on the same 
information (McNamara & Dempsey, 2011; van den Broek et al., 2011).    
Although previous research has shown that readers generally spend more time reading 
task-relevant text and recall more of this information than task-irrelevant text, this is not always 
the case (McCrudden, Schraw, & Kambe, 2005; Rapp & Mensink, 2011; Rapp & van den Broek, 
2005).  Although task instructions may affect moment-by-moment processing, they do not 
necessarily affect memory for text.  For instance, while readers might focus on task-relevant 
information during reading, this does not necessarily prevent readers from processing or 
encoding task-irrelevant information.  Similarly, although task instructions may affect memory 
for text, they do not necessarily affect moment-by-moment processing.  For instance, the value 
of information that is encountered during reading may change after reading when it is considered 
in relation to the entire text. 
Task instructions can differ in their specificity, ranging from more specific to more 
general (Goldman & Durán, 1988; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007).  Maier and Richter (2015) 
asked readers to approach a text with the general goals of summarizing or building an argument.  
Such general instructions may be more open to interpretation, allowing beliefs to play a greater 
role in online processes and memory.  In contrast, the present study utilized specific relevance 
instructions that are more explicit and less open for interpretation.  The specific relevance 
instructions led participants to include more task-relevant textual ideas in their recalls, 
independently of whether the ideas were belief-consistent.  Thus, the present study adds to the 
growing body of research by indicating that when asking students to comprehend material they 
do not agree with, teachers may need to provide specific instructions to focus on belief-
inconsistent text (Maier & Richter, 2014).  In addition, the present study provides some evidence 
Running head: TASK INSTRUCTIONS & BELIEFS  32 
 
that inconsistencies in prior work may be explained by how moderating variables (such as task 
instructions) can modify when and how beliefs affect memory.  Hence, future work should 
clearly identify potential moderating variables for understanding when and how beliefs can affect 
processing and memory. 
Another potential moderating variable might be the type of text with which readers 
interact.  The present study utilized extended, connected discourse, which differs from studies 
utilizing thought-listing tasks or single-sentence arguments. Extended, connected text is more 
like the types of texts students encounter in educational settings, and combining that with a 
think-aloud methodology provided us the ability to assess overt cognitive strategies in relation to 
offline recall. 
Limitations and Future Directions for Research 
There are several directions for future research.  Reading times are useful for 
investigating what readers pay attention to during reading. However, the self-paced, phrase-by-
phrase mode of reading does not mimic naturalistic reading, in which individuals can re-read 
previous information and view entire sentences or paragraphs.  Think-alouds provide detailed 
information about the processes readers engage in during reading. However, verbalizing one’s 
thoughts during reading may change how readers process text (Magliano & Graesser, 1991; 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Therefore, future research could investigate online processes that more 
closely reflect naturalistic reading, such as with the use of eye-tracking, which can provide a 
precise measure of attention allocation.  Similarly, it is possible to measure online process and 
offline products in a first experiment, followed by a second experiment in which participants 
read silently from paper and then complete offline measures.  This approach would be useful for 
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determining the extent to which the offline measures show similar patterns when reading under 
more- and less-naturalistic settings. 
Particular types of post-reading tasks may moderate the effects of beliefs on memory.  
For example, Maier and Richter (2013) found that participants recalled belief-inconsistent text at 
the textbase level of representation, whereas belief-consistent text was better integrated into the 
reader’s situational model level of representation (which contains inferences and connections to 
prior knowledge; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). In the present study, the recall task did not 
distinguish between the textbase versus situation model levels of representation. Although it is 
notable that the relevance instructions fostered memory independently of beliefs, future work 
should examine the extent to which belief- versus task-relevant information is encoded along 
varying levels of representation, and for different types of text.   
In the present study, we measured readers’ topic beliefs. Future research could investigate 
the effects of additional individual difference variables on online processes and offline products.  
For instance, additional individual difference variables that could be investigated include prior 
knowledge, reading abilities, working memory, emotion, or need for cognition.  Another avenue 
of future research may be to examine the extent to which the direction of one’s beliefs potentially 
mediates processing. 
The arguments in the text were plausible and attributed to credible sources.  Nonetheless, 
we did not collect participant ratings on the perceived quality of the arguments or the credibility 
of the sources.  Thus, an interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the extent 
to which argument quality and source credibility affect processing and memory. 
Finally, the study had some limitations that merit consideration.  Regarding the belief 
ratings, we used a one-item scale that directly addressed the specific topic of interest (i.e., 
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teaching ID in science classrooms).  However, it would be useful for future work to include a 
belief measure with multiple items to increase reliability.  In addition, the goal of the study was 
to examine potential interactions between the task, beliefs, and text content.  As such, we 
designed the study to include categorical assignment to task instructions, categorical text 
segments (relevant vs. irrelevant to the task instructions), and crossing belief categories with task 
instructions.  This design facilitated the examination of interactions.  However, we did not have 
the statistical power to examine beliefs and task instructions as separate variables. Future work 
might consider larger sample sizes and utilizing continuous variables to address potential non-
linear relations and account for strengths of beliefs.  As one final consideration, the recall task 
allowed us to quantify how many unique relevant versus irrelevant ideas participants included.  
Although we attempted to minimize demand characteristics by providing general instructions 
and not reminding participants of their reading goal, it is still possible participants purposefully 
omitted information that did not align with the task instructions, and hence the inclusion of 
smaller amounts of text.  Future work should compare different types of memory tasks. 
In practical classroom settings, students must learn about belief-related topics, yet beliefs 
can affect reading processes and memory for text (Maier & Richter, 2014). Thus, teachers should 
consider providing appropriate instructional supports and strategies when students are expected 
to build knowledge about belief-related topics (Sinatra et al., 2014).  Task instructions can be 
used to help students recall belief-related information.  The ability to recall information may be a 
first step in helping students understand different viewpoints and developing a strong knowledge 
base in a content area.  Future research should investigate ways to further improve understanding 
of conflicting viewpoints. For example, writing tasks could encourage students to demonstrate 
understanding by summarizing key ideas and arguments for different sides of an issue, and then 
Running head: TASK INSTRUCTIONS & BELIEFS  35 
 
have students argue in favor of and in opposition to these viewpoints.  This may help students 
make a clear distinction between what they are expected to understand and what they believe.   
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Table 1 
 
Sample sizes of participants receiving focus instructions as aligned with pre-existing beliefs 
 
  
Experiment 1:  
Task Instructions 
 
Experiment 2:  
Task Instructions 
Participants’  
Pre-Existing Beliefs For Against 
 
For Against 
 
For 12 17 
 
19 16 
Against 16 13  7 12 
Neutral 17 13  12 10 
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Table 2 
 
Experiment 1: Reading Times Per Word (in milliseconds) by Group 
 
 
 
 
Text Segment 
      
  
 
Relevant  Irrelevant  Overall 
 
Relevant - Irrelevant 
Belief/Task 
Alignment n M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
Match 25 348.6 (16.1) [316.6, 380.5]  349.6 (18.0) [313.8, 385.4] 
 
349.0 (16.6) [316.2, 381.8] 
 
-1.0 (10.1) [-21.9, 19.8] 
Mismatch 33 317.6 (14.0) [289.8, 345.4]  305.5 (15.7) [274.3, 336.7]  312.7 (14.4) [284.1, 341.2]  12.1 (8.2) [-4.6, 28.9] 
Neutral 30 353.2 (14.7) [324.0, 382.4]  347.3 (16.4) [314.6, 380.0]  349.4 (15.1) [319.5, 379.4]  5.9 (8.9) [-12.4, 24.2] 
Overall 88 339.8 (8.6) [322.7, 356.9]  334.1 (9.7) [314.9, 353.3]  337.0 (8.7) [319.6, 354.4]  5.7 (5.1) [-3.8, 16.5] 
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Table 3 
 
Experiment 1: Overall Proportion of Text Recalled by Each Group 
 
 
 
 
Text Segment 
      
  
 
Relevant  Irrelevant  Overall 
 
Relevant - Irrelevant 
Belief/Task 
Alignment n M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
Match 25 .09 (.01) [.07, .11]  .04 (.01) [.02, .06] 
 
.09 (.01) [.06, .08] 
 
.05 (.01) [.02, .08] 
Mismatch 33 .07 (.01) [.05, .09]  .03 (.01) [.02, .05]  .07 (.01) [.06, .08]  .04 (.01) [.02, .05] 
Neutral 30 .07 (.01) [.05, .09]  .05 (.01) [.03, .06]  .07 (.01) [.06, .09]  .02 (.01) [.003, .05] 
Overall 88 .08 (.005) [.07, .09]  .04 (.005) [.03, .05]  .06 (.004) [.05, .07]  .04 (.01) [.02, .05] 
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Table 4 
Experiment 2: Definitions and Examples of Each Think-Aloud Process 
 
Process Definition Text Excerpt Sample Participant Response 
Evaluations 
Stating opinions about the content 
of the text, further coded as 
supportive, refutational, or impartial 
  
 Supportive Evaluations 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that if 
alternatives to scientific explanations for the diversity of life are taught, it should 
not take place in science classes. 
“Um, again I agree that it shouldn’t take place in a science class.” 
 Refutational Evaluations 
Those who are in favor of teaching ID in science classes argue that it is counter-
productive to exclude non-scientific alternatives from science lessons because it 
alienates some children from science. 
“Non-scientific alternatives do not really belong in a scientific…class.” 
 Impartial Evaluations 
Either way, it seems that the topic of whether ID should be taught in science 
classes will continue to be a controversial issue. 
“I think both sides have, um, good viewpoints.” 
Backward 
Inferences 
Referring to information presented 
in earlier sentences that are relevant 
to, or explain, the current sentence 
Those who are in favor of teaching ID argue that teaching ID in science classes 
can help students overcome their misconceptions about science and learn to think 
critically about science. 
“You can’t take data, um, you can’t replicate the experiment.”  
 
(Referencing 4 sentences earlier: In science, explanations are restricted 
to results obtained through observations and experiments that can be 
substantiated by other researchers or scientists.) 
Elaborations  
Retrieving relevant background 
knowledge to help explain the 
current sentence or idea 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that if 
alternatives to scientific explanations for the diversity of life are taught, it should 
not take place in science classes. 
“Obviously like with budget cuts and everything, they don’t really have, 
um, the money to teach it in a separate class. 
of earth, um, came about.” 
Text 
Rehearsal 
Paraphrases or repetitions of the text 
that captured the gist meaning of the 
sentence 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that if 
alternatives to scientific explanations for the diversity of life are taught, it should 
not take place in science classes. 
“Um… Science—alternatives to scientific explanations uh, should not 
take place in scientific c---science classes.” 
Predictive 
Inferences  
Anticipations about what will come 
next, or logical outcomes based on 
the text 
Either way, it seems that the topic of whether ID should be taught in science 
classes will continue to be a controversial issue. 
“And that’s going to continue till one side proves they’re right either 
way.” 
Associations 
Retrieving background knowledge 
that is not relevant to the topic 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that ID is simply 
not science.  
“Darwin] Guy [Darwin] was a nut case… and an anti-Semite.” 
Monitoring  
Statements reflecting on one’s own 
understanding 
Those who are in favor of teaching ID argue that teaching ID in science classes 
can help students overcome their misconceptions about science and learn to think 
critically about science. 
“Um, I don’t really know how that would work.” 
Questions 
Asking a question of the 
experimenter or about the text 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that ID does not 
stimulate students or researchers to pursue knowledge. 
“Do you like going to class?” 
Affective 
Responses  
Making a comment about one’s own 
emotions, or having an emotional 
reaction (i.e., laughing) 
Next, you will read some arguments from some people who are in favor and 
from some who are opposed to teaching ID in science classrooms.  
[laughs] 
Non-
Responses 
Verbally stating that he/she does not 
have a response, or not responding 
to a starred sentence 
Those who are in favor of teaching ID in science classes argue that it is counter-
productive to exclude non-scientific alternatives from science lessons because it 
alienates some children from science. 
“I have no comment on that.” 
Other 
Any other response that did not fall 
into any of the other categories 
Those who are opposed to teaching ID in science classes argue that ID does not 
stimulate students or researchers to pursue knowledge. 
“I like cats.” 
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Table 5 
 
Experiment 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the Proportion of Think-Aloud 
Processes (n = 76) 
 
 
Process Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Text Rehearsal .10 .16 - .11 -.44*** -.47*** -.16 -.10 
 
2. Backward Inferences .06 .08  - -.28* -.20 -.14 -.19 
 
3. Elaborations .38 .18   - -.22 -.28* -.28** 
 
4. Evaluations .35 .14     -.13 -.03 
 
5. Monitoring .07 .09     - .27* 
 
6. Other .03 .07      - 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 6 
 
Adjusted Means (and Standard Errors) for Proportions of Think Aloud Processes 
   
 
Text Segment 
    
  
   
 
Relevant  Irrelevant 
 
Overall 
 
Relevant - Irrelevant 
Process 
Belief / Task 
Alignment n M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
Evaluations 
 
Match 31 .35 (.04) [.28, .43]  .34 (.03) [.28, .40] 
 
.35 (.03) [.31, .41] 
 
.01 (.04) -.07, .09] 
Mismatch 23 .31 (.04) [.22, .39]  .32 (.03) [.26, .39]  .33 (.03) [.26, .39]  -.02 (.04) [-.10, .06] 
Neutral 22 .37 (.04) [.28, .45]  .32 (.03) [.25, .39]  .35 (.03) [.28, .42]  .05 (.05) [-.06, .16] 
Overall 76 .34 (.02) [.30, .39]  .33 (.02) [.29, .37]  .34 (.02) [.30, .37]  .01 (.02) [-.04, .06] 
Supportive 
Evaluations 
(percentage within 
all evaluations) 
 
Match 31 .80 (.06) [.69, .91]  .28 (.06) [.17, .40] 
 
.43 (.03) [.36, .49] 
 
.52 (.08) [.36, .67] 
Mismatch 23 .26 (.07) [.13, .39]  .63 (.07) [.50, .76]  .38 (.04) [.30, .46]  -.37 (.12) [-.62, -.12] 
Neutral 22 .57 (.07) [.44, .71]  .20 (.07) [.06, .34]  .33 (.04) [.26, .41]  .37 (.11) [.14, .60] 
Overall 76 .54 (.04) [.47, .62]  .37 (.04) [.30, .45]  .46 (.02) [.41, .50]  .17 (.07) [.06, .35] 
Refutational 
Evaluations 
(percentage within 
all evaluations) 
 
Match 31 .16 (.06) [.05, .28]  .63 (.06) [.51, .76] 
 
.33 (.03) [.27, .39] 
 
-.47 (.08) -.64, -.30] 
Mismatch 23 .63 (.07) [.49, .76]  .21 (.07) [.07, .36]  .33 (.03) [.26, .40]  .42 (.12) [.16, .67] 
Neutral 22 .23 (.07) [.09, .36]  .52 (.07) [.38, .67]  .29 (.04) [.22, .36]  -.30 (.12) [-.54, -.05] 
Overall 76 .34 (.04) [.27, .41]  .46 (.04) [.38, .54]  .40 (.02) [.35, .45]  -.12 (.07) [-.30, -.003] 
Impartial 
Evaluations 
(percentage within 
all evaluations) 
 
Match 31 .03 (.02) [-.01, .08]  .05 (.03) [-.01, .10] 
 
.04 (.02) [.002, .07] 
 
-.01 (.02) [-.05, .02] 
Mismatch 23 .02 (.02) [-.03, .08]  .07 (.03) [.01, .13]  .04 (.02) [.003, .09]  -.05 (.02) [-.10, .00] 
Neutral 22 .11 (.03) [.06, .16]  .14 (.03) [.07, .20]  .10 (.02) [.06, .14]  -.04 (.03) [-.10, .04] 
Overall 76 .06 (.01) [.03, .08]  .09 (.02) [.05, .12]  .07 (.01) [.04, .10]  -.03 (.01) [-.06, .00] 
Backward 
Inferences 
 
Match 31 .045 (.02) [.01, .08]  .08 (.017) [.05, .11]  .07 (.01) [.04, .10] 
 
-.03 (.02) [-.07, .003] 
Mismatch 23 .061 (.02) [.02, .10]  .032 (.02) [-.01, .07]  .05 (.02) [.01, .08]  .03 (.02) [-.01, .07] 
Neutral 22 .067 (.02) [.03, .11]  .044 (.02) [.003, .08]  .05 (.02) [.02, .09]  .02 (.02) [-.02, .07] 
Overall 76 .06 (.01) [.04, .08]  .05 (.01) [.03, .07]  .05 (.01) [.04, .07]  .01 (.01) [-.02, .02] 
Elaborations 
 
Match 31 .40 (.04) [.32, .49]  .40 (.03) [.34, .47]  .40 (.03) [.33, .46] 
 
.001 (.02) [-.05, .05] 
Mismatch 23 .35 (.05) [.26, .45]  .42 (.04) [.34, .49]  .39 (.04) [.31, .47]  -.06 (.04) [-.15, .02] 
Neutral 22 .30 (.05) [.20, .40]  .37 (.04) [.30, .45]  .35 (.04) [.28, .43]  -.07 (.04) [-.15, .00] 
Overall 76 .35 (.03) [.30, .41]  .40 (.02) [.35, .44]  .38 (.02) [.33, .42]  -.04 (.02) [-.08, -.001] 
Note: Some totals in the Relevant – Irrelevant column are subject to rounding errors. 
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Table 7 
 
Experiment 2: Overall Proportion of Text Recalled by Each Group 
 
 
 
 
Text Segment 
      
  
 
Relevant  Irrelevant  Overall 
 
Relevant - Irrelevant 
 
Belief/Task 
Alignment n M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
M (SE) 95% CI 
 
Match 31 .05 (.01) [.04, .07]  .05 (.01) [.03, .07] 
 
.08 (.01) [.07, .09] 
 
.01 (.01) [-.01, .02] 
Mismatch 23 .05 (.01) [.03, .08]  .03 (.01) [.01, .05]  .07 (.01) [.05, .08]  .03 (.01) [.005, .05] 
Neutral 22 .09 (.01) [.06, .11]  .06 (.01) [.03, .08]  .09 (.01) [.08, .11]  .03 (.02) [-.01, .07] 
Overall 76 .07 (.01) [.05, .08]  .04 (.01) [.03, .06]  .05 (.005) [.05, .06]  .02 (.07) [.004, .03] 
Note: Some totals in the Relevant – Irrelevant column are subject to rounding errors. 
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Figure 1 
 
  
Task 
Instructions 
Participant 
Beliefs about 
Teaching ID 
Belief/Task-
Alignment 
Focus on 
arguments 
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Neutral  
Against 
For 
Neutral 
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Match 
Neutral  
Against 
For 
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Match 
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arguments 
against 
teaching ID 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Note.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Note.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
Note.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
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